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October 14, 2010

Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Posted by John Baez

How many people reading this blog also read Less Wrong — “a community blog devoted to refining the art of rationality”? Though I don’t know, I’d guess it’s just a small fraction. So here are some fun essays you might not have seen, written by the mathematician Jonah Sinick:

I am intrigued by Sinick’s suggestion that mathematicians have a “markedly lower than usual interest in status” than most people. I don’t believe it, and I tried to explain why in a comment over there. But he certainly assembled some interesting quotes on the subject. For example, from an interview with Gromov:

Raussen and Skau: We are surprised that you are so modest by playing down your own achievements. Maybe your ideas are naive, as you yourself say; but to get results from these ideas, that requires some ingenuity, doesn’t it?

Gromov: It is not that I am terribly modest. I don’t think I am a complete idiot. Typically when you do mathematics you don’t think about yourself. A friend of mine was complaining that anytime he had a good idea he became so excited about how smart he was that he could not work afterwards. So naturally, I try not to think about it.

It makes sense that while mathematicians are thinking about math they need to focus completely on the subject to do good work, and don’t have time to be concerned with status.

It would also be very surprising if Gromov, in response to this question, said “Yeah, I’m incredibly ingenious. That’s why you’re interviewing me, right?”

Posted at October 14, 2010 2:55 AM UTC

39 Comments & 0 Trackbacks

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Thanks for your feedback.

Note that my suggestion is that

It’s noticeably less common for mathematicians of the highest caliber to engage in status games than members of the general population do.

This is consistent with your remark:

It makes sense that while mathematicians are thinking about math they need to focus completely on the subject to do good work, and don’t have time to be concerned with status.

as the very best mathematicians typically spend a lot more time fully focused on math than is typical among mathematicians. I find it plausible that such focus tends to spill over into nonmathematical activity as well. In Henri Poincare’s “Ethics and Science,” Poincare wrote

Can science become the creator or the inspirer of feelings? What science cannot do, will the love of science be able to do?

Science keeps us in constant relation with something which is greater than ourselves; it offers us a spectacle which is constantly renewing itself and growing always more vast. Behind the great vision it affords us, it leads us to guess at something greater still; this spectacle is a joy to us, but it is a joy in which we forget ourselves and thus it is morally sound.

He who has tasted of this, who has seen, if only from afar, the splendid harmony of the natural laws will be better disposed than another to pay little attention to his petty, egoistic interests. He will have an ideal which he will value more than himself, and that is the only ground on which we can build an ethics. He will work for this ideal without sparing himself and without expecting any of those vulgar rewards which are everything to some persons; and when he has assumed the habit of disinterestedness, this habit will follow him everywhere; his entire life will remain as if flavored with it.

For a counterpoint to my suggestion, I’d point to Grothendieck’s remark in “Recoltes et Semailles” (quoted in my “Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics” article):

The truth of the matter is that it is universally the case that, in the real motives of the scientist, of which he himself is often unaware in his work, vanity and ambition will play as large a role as they do in all other professions. The forms that these assume can be in turn subtle or grotesque, depending on the individual. Nor do I exempt myself.

Concerning your remarks:

Every mathematician worth his or her salt knows of Hironaka, Langlands, Gromov, Thurston and Grothendieck. So these are not typical mathematicians: they are our heroes, our gods.

It is nice having humble gods. But still, they’re not stupid: they know they’re our gods.

I think that expressions of humility that great mathematicians exhibit may be genuine. The historical standard for quality is very high and exposure to the work of great mathematicians of the past and the historical sweep of the subject can be humbling. In a 1940 letter of André Weil on Analogy in Mathematics, Weil wrote

Of course, I am not foolish enough to compare myself to Riemann; but to add a little bit, whatever it is, to Riemann, that would already be, as they say in Greek, to do something {[faire quelque chose]}, even if in order to do it you have the silent help of Galois, Poincaré and Artin.

In “Commencement address at the University of Toronto, June 1993”, Robert Langlands wrote:

It is difficult for those with no experience to understand that most mathematical issues are, in spite of the efforts of our great predecessors, in large part unresolved. Although not so chaotic or undisciplined as the world around us, mathematics does reveal itself in shapes and patterns that, like those of light and sound, can never be seized once and for all. To impose order on them requires often heroic efforts.

Moreover, although mathematics is an art that is anterior to the classical Mediterranean civilizations, it moves slowly. We are not so far from the number theory of Fermat in the seventeenth century, nor from the mechanics of fluids and solids of Euler in the eighteenth.

Posted by: Jonah Sinick on October 14, 2010 4:54 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Jonah wrote:

Note that my suggestion is that

It’s noticeably less common for mathematicians of the highest caliber to engage in status games than members of the general population do.

Oh, sorry — for some reason I didn’t notice that qualifier. I’m not sure how that affects my reaction, but it does change the issue.

Posted by: John Baez on October 14, 2010 6:05 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Right. I do think that there is something to the remarks by Todd Trimble and SarahC, but did not intend for my suggestion about mathematicians of the highest caliber to extend to mathematicians in general.

While I have much less experience with the mathematical community than you do, what impressions I have formed are consistent with your comment

In my 25 years of being a professional mathematician I’ve found many (though certainly not all) mathematicians to be acutely aware of status, particularly those who work at high-status institutions. If you are a research mathematician your job is to be smart. To get a good job, you need to convince other people that you are smart. So, there is quite a well-developed “pecking order” in mathematics.

As I said in response to JoshuaZ’s comment that “this may not be true just for math but for other areas as well,”

I completely agree. I wrote about math because it’s what I know best, not to suggest that the phenomenon that I allude to is true for math more than for other fields.

Though I don’t have a very intimate acquaintance of areas other than math, I find MatthewW’s remark

I think it’s quite normal that if someone is acknowledged by their peers to be among the very best at what they do, they won’t waste much time with status games.

plausible. To the extent that this is true, we have a lot to learn from the best practitioners of a given art or science about their fields of speciality, not only because they have uncommonly good subject matter knowledge but also because what they have to say is relatively free of the noise that accompanies status games.

Posted by: Jonah Sinick on October 14, 2010 8:04 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Some of the mathematicians whom I know who are also at the highest caliber often were very much involved in a status game at earlier stages of their careers. Fortunately for the rest of us, almost of of them are also decent human beings who recognize the nature of mathematical struggle.

However, those at a slightly lower status often control the gates to enter the profession at their levels. I often look with bemusement at the careers of many of us who completed our degrees in the late 1970s and early 1980s and see where we have landed. Not only are the ranges of institutions remarkable, but the ranges of quality and quantity of output is not institutionally dependent. Part of the amusement is in having overheard the comments of the establishment in regard to one or the other — a child overhearing something naughty going on in the parlor.

So I agree with JB that we are keenly aware of our status within the profession. And especially, we are overwhelmed with joy when our more established mathematical siblings, cousins, and uncles recognize our work. Those who are established should know that the younger ones enjoy your (our?) recognition.

Posted by: Scott Carter on October 15, 2010 1:32 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

we have a lot to learn from the best practitioners of a given art or science about their fields of speciality… because what they have to say is relatively free of the noise that accompanies status games.

I can see this point. However, it also seems to me that sometimes, when people are free from “playing status games,” what they have to say acquires other sorts of noise that they would have felt obligated to suppress if they were still trying to convince other people of the worth of their content. For instance, I can think of some well-known mathematicians who acquired (or began to express) peculiar or extreme political views and seemed unable to separate them from their mathematics. Or began drifting off into philosophy that may or may not have any value to mathematics. Or expressed fairly extreme/unsensitive views about the value or potentialities of a field of math with which they are not all that well acquainted. Perhaps the people I’m thinking of don’t all qualify as “of the highest caliber,” but I’m fairly sure that some of them do.

I’m not saying that “playing status games” is a good thing—in point of fact, I dislike it, and I especially dislike the egotistical impulse in myself that it encourages. But I think there’s some evidence that people who “know they’re our gods,” as John put it, sometimes feel free to act on whims like the gods of Greek mythology. Obviously different people react to fame differently, but I’m wary of an attempt to generalize over all mathematicians, even over the best ones.

Posted by: Mike Shulman on October 15, 2010 4:24 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Michael,

Thanks for your remark which I fully agree with. I’ve definitely seen examples of the phenomenon that you allude to. Sometimes people start to believe strange things when they’re freed of social pressures. Figuring out how much weight to give to the views of a given luminary on a given subject requires a subtle judgment call. Certainly one shouldn’t give much weight to the views of a great artist or scientist on a subject that he or she doesn’t appear to know much about, and there’s a real danger of unknowingly doing so if one is not careful because of the halo effect.

Fortunately, there are many examples of great mathematicians who are careful to avoid making claims that are too strong. Also, individual eccentricities tend to balance out when one observes enough examples. My own experience has been that I’ve gotten a much more accurate picture of mathematics by observing the attitudes, interests and behaviors of great mathematicians as a group than I have from observing groups of random mathematicians of comparable size.

Posted by: Jonah Sinick on October 16, 2010 12:40 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

I am intrigued by Sinick’s suggestion that mathematicians have a “markedly lower than usual interest in status” than most people. I don’t believe it, and I tried to explain why in a comment over there.

John, could you give a link to your comment, please?

There are two aspects that seem obvious to me. One the one hand, it’s obvious that we mathematicians crave respect from our peers: gaining the respect from smart people we respect is arguably a major drive that keeps us going.

But we are also very lucky in that status always takes a back seat to logical correctness. It is a wonderful thing that if a graduate student points out a flaw in the argument of the illustrious Professor, the point must be quickly (and is usually graciously) admitted. I don’t see how you can be a mathematician without being fanatically committed to logical truth: only a fool clings to status over a mathematical truth which will soon enough become obvious to all!

Indeed, we mathematicians are fantastically lucky that we can so easily come to agreement (compared to philosophy or politics say), on account of the strict rules of our game. This makes real and rapid progress in our field possible, in a way unlike any other field.

Posted by: Todd Trimble on October 14, 2010 6:33 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Todd wrote:

John, could you give a link to your comment, please?

Currently it’s right below Sinick’s post on vanity and ambition in mathematics… but here’s a permalink.

Indeed, we mathematicians are fantastically lucky that we can so easily come to agreement (compared to philosophy or politics say), on account of the strict rules of our game.

Indeed. In the other fields you mention, settling on the rules of the game is a major aspect of the game. Some of that happens in the ‘foundations of mathematics’, but luckily the upper stories are largely insulated from those foundational disputes.

Posted by: John Baez on October 14, 2010 9:34 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

if a graduate student points out a flaw in the argument of the illustrious Professor, the point must be quickly (and is usually graciously) admitted

While this is true, woe betide the graduate student who innocently pricks the wrong professor’s ego, and loses an ally or gains an enemy. Mathematics itself may be logical, but the business of being a mathematician is no less political than any other.

Posted by: John Armstrong on October 14, 2010 1:07 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Right: corrections need to be tendered with a certain degree of sensitivity and politesse. Many mathematicians get very upset with themselves if they are caught out in a logical error, all the more so if the error is pointed out publicly, so one should proceed with care.

Posted by: Todd Trimble on October 14, 2010 4:30 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

‘It is also the case that the most totally consuming ambition is powerless to make or to demonstrate the simplest mathematical discovery - even as it is powerless ( for example) to “score” ( in the vulgar sense). Whether one is male or female, that which allows one to ‘score’ is not ambition, the desire to shine, to exhibit one’s prowess, sexual in this case. Quite the contrary!’


Can anyone explain to me the meaning of this quote from Grothendieck?

Posted by: guru on October 16, 2010 3:02 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Are you asking about the literal meaning? Is this a question about English? Do you know what ‘to score’ means? This is slang, usually used by men, meaning ‘to succeed in getting someone to have sex’. It’s a metaphor taken from sports, where ‘scoring’ means winning a point.

This essay is pretty relevant. It concludes: “The bottom line is that risk-taking can be a tool that men use to show potential mates that they have desirable qualities such as confidence or ambition”.

But Grothendieck is arguing that in fact, the key to ‘scoring’ is not ambition or the desire to show off.

Whether he’s right when it comes to sex is debatable — but not on this blog.

More important here is his claim that ambition is unable to produce a mathematical discovery. He believed that the key to mathematical discovery is a kind of innocent curiosity and playfulness.

It’s worth comparing John Nash, who at one point went around asking mathematicians for their hardest unsolved problems, so he could try to solve them. He was clearly in the grip of raw ambition.

On the other hand, I don’t think that’s how Nash discovered the things for which he’s famous.

Posted by: John Baez on October 16, 2010 4:30 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

On the other hand, I don’t think that’s how Nash discovered the things for which he’s famous.

The Nash embedding theorem is one of the things Nash is famous for (albeit in narrow circles) and he proved it because Ambrose told Nash that this is the hardest unsolved problem in differential geometry.

Posted by: Eugene Lerman on October 16, 2010 12:31 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Okay, so Nash really did get somewhere using the ‘give me your hardest problem’ approach. Interesting. The Nash embedding theorem is indeed quite amazing, and justly famous…

(albeit in narrow circles)

… while in wider circles, Nash is most famous for being a character played by Russell Crowe.

Posted by: John Baez on October 17, 2010 7:55 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

I think it is ironic that the context of Grothendieck’s reflections about ambition and innocence is that he was accusing his former students and colleagues, mathematicians of very high caliber, of letting ambition stifle their innocence, as well as admitting that he had done so himself.

Nash’s case shows that ambition can give one tremendous drive to pursue a problem, but I think Grothendieck’s point was that all the ambition in the world, and all the drive it gives, is not the root of the creative impulse that leads to understanding that leads to a solution to a problem, and that ambition can actually stifle this impulse. So there is this push-pull dynamic between ambition and the creative impulse, which plays out in different ways for different people at different times.

Incidentally, Grothendieck and Nash were friendly with each other according to A Beautiful Mind. Does anyone know if Nash is mentioned in Recoltes et Semailles?

Posted by: tjs on October 17, 2010 6:44 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Forty years ago, I heard the following story from Gonzalo Reyes:

Paul Cohen, the Fields medalist who proved the independence of the continuum hypothesis, was not a logician but an analyst. He became interested in logic after meeting Georg Kreisel. The story says that Cohen had formulated the view that logic was a rather trivial subject when compared to analysis, a view strongly rejected by Kreisel. As a challenge, Cohen asked Kreisel to give him a list of the most important important problems of logic, he would try to solve them. Kreisel gave him two famous problems: (1) to prove the consistency of ZF set theory;(2) to prove or disprove the continuum hypothesis. The story is that Cohen could not solved the first, but that he found quickly a solution to the second.

Raw competition between mathematicians can play a positive role in research. I imagine that we are all competing subconsciously with those we admire. We may wish to surpass them in some sense. A mathematician working in Riemannian geometry is, in a sense, competing with Riemann. A physicist working in quantum gravity is, in a sense, competing with Einstein and Feynman.

After proving the independence of the continuum hypothesis, Cohen spent most of his life trying to prove the Riemann Hypothesis, but failed. Hence proving indirectly that analysis is harder than logic?

Posted by: André Joyal on October 17, 2010 6:32 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

Ambitious alums in Math from my high school; Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

That story is consistent with versions told at Stuyvesant High School, at least when I took Math there 1965-1968, where Paul Cohen was one of our most distinguished Math graduates. These great Math alums who preceded us were held up as examples of how far we might all go, even those such as I who were below the mean in Grade Point Average, if we were sufficiently ambitious.

Forcing was invented by Paul Cohen for proving consistency and independence results, and was first used, in 1962, to prove the independence of the continuum hypothesis and the axiom of choice from Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory.

Stuyvesant High School has produced a steady stream of professional mathematicians, including more leading figures in this field than are associated with most leading universities:

* Bernard Gelbaum (1939) functional analysis (University at Buffalo, emeritus)
* Benjamin Lepson (1941) analysis (Catholic University, emeritus)
* Peter Lax (1943)[2] fluid dynamics, differential equations; elected 1970 to the United States National Academy of Sciences, 1985 Wolf Prize, 1992 Steele Prize, 2005 Abel Prize, (New York University, emeritus)
* Seymour Goldberg (1944) operator theory, textbook author (University of Maryland, College Park, emeritus)
* Melvin Hausner (1945) nonstandard analysis, geometry (New York University (NYU))
* Bertram Kostant (1945) Lie groups and representation theory; elected in 1978 to the United States National Academy of Sciences, (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
* Anatole Beck (1947) dynamical systems (University of Wisconsin, emeritus)
* D. J. Newman (1947) analytic number theory, long-time editor of problems section in the American Mathematical Monthly (Temple University, emeritus)
* Harold Widom (1949) integral equations, symplectic geometry (University of California, Santa Cruz), 2007 Wiener Prize
* Elias Stein (1949) harmonic analysis; 1974 elected to United States National Academy of Sciences, 1993 Schock Prize, 1999 Wolf Prize, 2002 Steele Prize (Princeton University)
* Joel Pinkus (1950) State University of New York at Stony Brook
* Paul Cohen (1950) logic, Banach algebras, 1964 Bôcher Prize, 1966 Fields Medal, elected 1967 to the United States National Academy of Sciences (Stanford University)
* Leonard Evens (1951) group cohomology (Northwestern University)
* Neil R. Grabois (1953) commutative algebra (President, Colgate University)
* Saul Lubkin (1956) homological algebra, algebraic geometry (University of Rochester)
* Jeff Rubens (1957) probability and statistics, coeditor of The Bridge World (Pace University)
* Saul Zaveler (1957)[citation needed] applied math United States Air Force Academy
* Mark Ramras (1958) graph theory, commutative algebra (Northeastern University)
* Jonathan Sondow (1959) number theory, differential topology
* Melvin Hochster (1960) commutative algebra, algebraic geometry, invariant theory; 1980 Cole Prize, elected in 1992 to the United States National Academy of Sciences (University of Michigan)
* George Bergman (1960) algebra (University of California, Berkeley)
* Howard Jacobowitz (1961) differential geometry (Rutgers University)
* James Lepowsky (1961) Lie theory (Rutgers University). Lepowsky’s Ph.D advisor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology was Bertram Konstant (1945).
* Daniel Kotlow (1961) differential equations (Micrologic)
* Peter Shalen (1962 low dimensional topology, Kleinian groups, hyperbolic geometry (University of Illinois at Chicago)
* Michael Ackerman (1962) number theory, topos theory; Ackerman was an assistant to André Weil at the Institute for Advanced Study, (Northeastern University, emeritus)
* Robert Zimmer (1964) ergodic theory, dynamical cocycles (President of University of Chicago)
* Sandy Zabell (1964) large deviations and Bayesian statistics (Northwestern University)
* Bruce Cooperstein (1966) groups of Lie type, combinatorics, geometry (Chair, University of California, Santa Cruz)
* Steven Weintraub (1967) differential topology, algebraic topology (LSU)
* Richard Arratia (1968)[14] probability, combinatorics (USC)
* David Harbater (1970)algebraic geometry; NSF Postdoctoral Fellow, in 1994 Invited Lecturer to the International Congress of Mathematicians, 1995 Cole Prize (University of Pennsylvania)
* Greg Kirmayer (1971) set theory.
* Paul Zeitz (1975) ergodic theory (University of California, San Francisco).
* David Grant (1977) number theory (University of Colorado at Boulder)
* Jon Lee (1977)[1] discrete optimization (IBM Research)
* Eric Stade (1978) number theory (Chair, University of Colorado at Boulder)
* Zachary Franco (1981) number theory, mathematical pathology Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center
* Ann Trenk (1981) combinatorics, graph theory (Wellesley College)
* Noam Elkies (1982) elliptic curves; youngest person ever to win tenure at Harvard; his musical compositions have been performed by major symphony orchestras (Harvard University).
* Dana Randall (1984) discrete mathematics, theoretical computer science (Georgia Tech).
* Allen Knutson (1986) symplectic geometry, algebraic combinatorics, NSF Postdoc, Sloan Fellow, 2005 Levi L. Conant Prize (Cornell University).
* Thomas Witelski (1987) diffusion processes, PDEs, NSF Postdoc (Duke University).
* Elizabeth Wilmer (1987) probability theory, combinatorics (Oberlin College).
* Zeph Laundau (1987) signal processing, quantum computation, theoretical neuroscience (City College of New York).
* Michael Coen (1987)computational learning theory, theoretical neuroscience. (University of Wisconsin–Madison).
* Sandy Ganzell (1988) topology, knot theory. (St. Mary’s College of Maryland).
* Michael Hutchings (1989)[24] topology, geometry (University of California, Berkeley).
* Aleksandr Khazanov (1995) Math Olympiad, Curry Fellowship; Khazanov skipped college and became a PhD student at Pennsylvania State University.
* Michael Develin (1996) combinatorics, geometry; American Institute of Mathematics Fellow. (University of California, Berkeley).

Posted by: Jonathan Vos Post on October 17, 2010 7:09 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Ambitious alums in Math from my high school; Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

The story about Paul Cohen is, I’m almost fully certain, true. I heard it from 1972 onwards, from people who knew Kreisel and Cohen.

Posted by: George Berger on October 17, 2010 7:50 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Here is the story that Cohen told in his interview for More Mathematical People (it’s a long excerpt but I assume it’s fair use):

MP: So how did it happen that you finally did get involved in working on the problem of the continuum hypothesis? That was a real challenge – to try and get a satisfactory answer to Cantor’s question of whether the transfinite cardinal of the continuum of the real numbers is the next largest after the transfinite cardinal of the integers!

Cohen: Well, in Chicago I worked on the Littlewood problem, which was of course a problem of harmonic analysis, and in the end I was very happy with my partial solution of it. Then I went to MIT and started working on other branches of analysis. I really saw myself as an analyst, and I thought analysis was where I belonged. Then I came to Stanford in 1961.

During my first year I was at a departmental lunch one day with Sol Feferman and Halsey Royden. They were talking about a “consistency proof” for mathematics. I was a little bit distrustful of the idea of a consistency proof but I said, “If you really want an informal consistency proof, you could get one for all of set theory if in some sense you would suitably define your objectives and what you mean by a consistency proof.” Sol was distrustful of such a philosophical approach, but I began to think about it. I had in mind a kind of vague induction scheme to show how all concepts could be more solidly based on previous concepts until you hit rock bottom and were satisfied. In this way you could in a sense convince yourself philosophically that set theory is based on some kind of truth. I tried to give a couple of lectures on the idea but I felt that Gödel’s theorem, which says you can’t prove the consistency of a system within itself, was always lurking in the background. If you tried to get around it by proving something philosophically appealing, you’d always run into some objection. You couldn’t get around Gödel’s theorem. However, because I had thought about the subject informally for several years, I thought I had developed some intuition about set theory, to which I was somewhat attached. I felt that I understood matters, but I also felt that I couldn’t convince anyone, so to speak. Still, the whole question seemed a side issue to me, not having any purely mathematical interest but being rather more philosophical – something to talk to students about in casual conversation. But I wondered whether there was any problem to which one could actually apply one’s intuition.

I don’t know who said it to me, perhaps it was Sol Feferman, but somebody eventually said something like, “Well, if you think you understand set theory and you think it’s consistent, why not investigate the problem of the continuum hypothesis?”

Not being a specialist in the field at that time, I did not know precisely how the problem was regarded. What I do remember is that the independence of the continuum hypothesis did not seem to be regarded as a really well posed problem. People said, “Well, what would it mean ‘to solve it’?”

Gödel had published a famous article in the American Mathematical Monthly entitled “What is Cantor’s Continuum Problem?” I don’t think I had read it, or at least not carefully. In general, I had the feeling that people thought the problem was hopeless since there was no new way of constructing models of set theory – indeed they thought you had to be slightly crazy even to think about the problem. It wasn’t that it was considered to be such an impossible problem, but it seemed to be tied up with the philosophy of mathematics rather than with mathematics itself. No one specifically said so, but there was a feeling that something radically new would have to be done to solve it. Also, actually, I didn’t get the impression that mathematicians not in logic were all that interested. That may sound strange, but it seemed true at the time. All in all, the problem seemed to be in a kind of limbo.

I was probably more interested in the problem of the axiom of choice at that time, because for many mathematicians the axiom of choice is used more frequently and plays a more important role than the continuum hypothesis. Philosophically people may feel that the problem of the continuum hypothesis is more interesting, but I was thinking more from the point of view of what mathematicians use. For a few months I worked intensively on proving the independence of the axiom of choice. Then, for various reasons, I thought that some of my ideas were approaching those used by Gödel in his consistency proof of the axiom of choice, but my knowledge of his work was mostly hearsay because I still hadn’t actually read his book. When I finally read it, I saw that I was really redicovering known work. But – and this may be a controversial thing to say – I didn’t really feel that Gödel’s proof was understood very well by mathematicians. People evidently thought it was much more arcane than it was, possibly because of the rather formalistic exposition. It was after my work, I think, that people saw that the basic ideas were simpler than they were sometimes thought to be.

At that time I actually had ideas which were very close to the final solution of the problem of the continuum hypothesis. I had, intuitively, a very strong philosophical feeling about the direction the proof should go; nevertheless, I felt totally frustrated. I was so low at one point that I stopped thinking about the problem for four or five months. Then, during the winter holidays at the end of 1962, I went on a long trip with my wife-to-be, touring the Southwest, taking in the Grand Canyon and all that. I spent many hours in the car driving, and I began to get a strong feeling of confidence that the thing could be done. I didn’t feel that the difficulties were entirely technical. I still felt, however, that there was a kind of philosophical conspiracy which was preventing me from pushing through, so I was still discouraged, and I let the problem lie fallow for some time even after I came back here.

It was about April 1963 that I started getting closer and closer. I suddenly felt that I had the general idea of what this new notion of “truth” was that I was looking for. It was still quasi-philosophical, and I really couldn’t prove anything yet. But then I suddenly saw that the whole thing was beginning to fit together. I remember there was a period of about a week when I had a notion which was very close to my final notion. I was talking to a logician in the philosophy department about it in a general sort of way, and at one point he said to me, “Well, you know, you have some interesting ideas, but this idea you have is – I’m sure – wrong.” I wasn’t discouraged when he said that because I took it for exactly what I think it was; namely, things were becoming so specific that it was hard for someone to believe that there was a whole system of set theory that could be constructed with such ease – that you could have such control over it. I said to him, “Boy, once you can do this you can do just about anything!” In other words, you could handle almost all the famous set theory problems in a similar manner. And this seemed very hard for him to swallow. The reason he thought I was wrong was precisely because I was so close to the truth.

By the middle of April I thought I had solved the problem. What made it so exciting to me was how ideas which at first seemed merely philosophical could actually be made into precise mathematics. I went up to Berkeley to see Dana Scott and run the proof past him. I was very, very excited. At a coffee shop I bumped into an old Chicago friend who asked, “What brings you up to Berkeley?” And I said, “Well, have you heard of this problem of the continuum hypothesis?” From his reaction it began to dawn on me that my solution of the problem was going to excite people. Two months later Gödel gave the proof his stamp of approval.

Posted by: Todd Trimble on October 17, 2010 1:30 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

As I understand it, the quote from Jonah was about the *comparison* to other fields of activity. In this, I tend to agree. Obviously, political considerations will be part of most human affairs and you can bring up your favorite example of the arrogance of Professor X. But still, on the whole, my feeling is that the landscape of mathematics is remarkably even.

I have quite a few anecdotal bits of evidence, but the ones that come closest to being concrete I get by comparing notes with my father, who works in literature.

I often organize mathematical events and my father organizes literary events. When we discuss these things, he is regularly amazed at how easy it is for an ordinary person like me to invite distinguished mathematicians when compared to the enormous production involved in inviting distinguished writers. The latter often employ agents, and demand tens of thousands of USD for a single lecture. I’ve remarked elsewhere that this kind of display often creates the wrong impression that writers are better off than mathematicians, even though the average active writer would starve without another job. To make this into a quantitative statement would obviously take careful work, but my impression is that the *difference* of (actual and self-perceived) status among practioners of literature, as well much of the arts, is markedly larger than in mathematics.

Here is another story (intended to be funny, mostly): My father was once involved in an attempt to invite Professor N to Korea, a philosopher, and perhaps one of the most distinguished within the liberal/radical school in the US. As mentioned, people are quite used by now to the demand for high fees, airfare, and so forth. In this case, the philosopher asked the organizers to make sure that the hotel had an exercise room. This was done. After a while, inquiry was made about a specific piece of equipment. This seemed a bit strange, but the hosts obliged. And then, they were asked to make sure about the specific brand…(things got a bit strained at this point). As I said, we all know examples of the antics of mathematician X. But my feeling is it’s not too well-known among my colleagues how extreme things can be in other professions.

If I would venture as guess as to the reasons for this difference, the nature of the work itself may indeed play a role. But at least one important (and related) factor seems to involve the size of the cognizant community. Even a Fields medallist (and the medal itself) is virtually unknown outside of the mathematicial community. Famous writers, artists, and philosophers, on the other hand, often have a presence in the public media.

Posted by: Minhyong Kim on October 17, 2010 2:00 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

My impressions agree with Minhyong’s and Jonah’s observations. Members of the mathem. community are usually by far easier (and then, more interesting) to communicate with than other science communities, e.g. the humanities. And within the math community, communicability seems to correlate strongly with how bright the people are in general. In this way, I’d say that status estimations play only a small role.

Actually, I guess the cause is simple that good mathematicians tend to have “good brains”, and that the later shows up in communication style too. A need for external, visible and linear symbols of status may anyway be just a substitute for internal complexity, therefore rarified in areas whose workers need their brains. I wonder if one psy. online research on such issues has been done already (like this).

SarahC’s remarks fit to my impressions too very much.

Posted by: Thomas on October 17, 2010 2:02 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

The comparison with people who work in the humanities feels very unfair to me. Mathematics is easier to communicate because it’s easier to study than human beings. The rules of the game are clean and under control and one needs very little knowledge to do effective mathematics (as opposed to say psychology, where the range of things one has to know to get the facts under any sort of decent control is, by necessity, far more vast).

In mathematics, there is a greater premium on deep understanding than on command of a disparate array of facts. In humanities, the same level of deep principled understanding we enjoy in mathematics is hopelessly out of reach in the present day.

If I place the sentences

Members of the mathem. community are usually by far easier (and then, more interesting) to communicate with than other science communities, e.g. the humanities.

and

Actually, I guess the cause is simple that good mathematicians tend to have “good brains”, and that the later shows up in communication style too.

side by side, I am left with a very uneasy feeling. It comes close to sounding very elitist.

Posted by: Todd Trimble on October 17, 2010 3:17 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

I’m sympathetic to your remark. There’s a well documented phenomenon of illusory superiority among humans. Because of this, as a heuristic I think that it’s best to adopt the cautious position that members of group X are not qualified judges of the merits of group X relative to other groups because members of group X can be expected to be systematically biased in favor of group X. In Thomas’ defense, note that he describes himself as

a kind of outsider who is just curious about some themes in math too and asks around for infos, explanations and preprints/slides

As a math graduate student I cannot say the same for myself. In light of this, my remarks on this subject should be taken with an appropriate grain of salt.

That being said there’s a piece of evidence in favor of Thomas’ conclusion which you may not have considered. Suppose that there’s a “general intellectual caliber” variable and that those of high general intellectual caliber want to be recognized for this and want to be surrounded by others who are similar. Suppose that it’s difficult to recognize the general intellectual caliber of researchers in field A and it’s easy to recognize the general intellectual caliber of researchers in field B. Then all else being equal, those of high general intellectual caliber will be drawn toward field A rather than field B.

In juxtaposition with this, your remarks

The rules of the game are clean and under control and one needs very little knowledge to do effective mathematics (as opposed to say psychology, where the range of things one has to know to get the facts under any sort of decent control is, by necessity, far more vast).

In mathematics, there is a greater premium on deep understanding than on command of a disparate array of facts. In humanities, the same level of deep principled understanding we enjoy in mathematics is hopelessly out of reach in the present day.

would seem to support Thomas’ conclusion! :-)

Of course, there may be other stronger factors that argue against Thomas’ conclusion, and in any case one should always understand such statements to hold only on average. I have very high regard for some people working in the social sciences and humanities. Some of my favorites contemporary researchers are:

Daniel Kahneman in psychology and behavioral economics and his coauthors.

Bryan Magee for his book The Tristan Chord: Wagner and Philosophy which remains one of my favorite books (in or outside of math).

•Philosopher Nick Bostrom for his work on analyzing and drawing attention to existential risk. See for example his article on Astronomical Waste.

David Cutler for his work on health economics.

I’m sure that there are many that I’m forgetting and many more that I haven’t been exposed to.

Posted by: Jonah Sinick on October 17, 2010 5:01 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Jonah wrote:

Suppose that there’s a “general intellectual caliber” variable and that those of high general intellectual caliber want to be recognized for this and want to be surrounded by others who are similar. Suppose that it’s difficult to recognize the general intellectual caliber of researchers in field A and it’s easy to recognize the general intellectual caliber of researchers in field B. Then all else being equal, those of high general intellectual caliber will be drawn toward field A rather than field B.

Those are some mighty big suppositions in my opinion, especially that “all else being equal”. Maybe this sometimes happens, but I have to believe that’s rare. I’d think that normally people gravitate to math for nothing like that reason, but because they have some innate aptitude for it, or mathematics accords with their intellectual taste, or whatever. If one finds that one is drawn to talking with and being surrounded by mathematical types, I’d think it’s primarily because there is a subject of deep mutual interest involved.

would seem to support Thomas’ conclusion!

Wow, that would be a terrible misreading of what I meant! I was making more of an epistemological point about the contrasts between math and other subjects, than I was about quality of intellect and all that.

Posted by: Todd Trimble on October 17, 2010 6:22 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Those are some mighty big suppositions in my opinion, especially that “all else being equal”.

I completely agree. I was just pointing to a potentially relevant factor.

Maybe this sometimes happens, but I have to believe that’s rare. I’d think that normally people gravitate to math for nothing like that reason, but because they have some innate aptitude for it, or mathematics accords with their intellectual taste, or whatever. If one finds that one is drawn to talking with and being surrounded by mathematical types, I’d think it’s primarily because there is a subject of deep mutual interest involved.

I’m agnostic on how common the phenomenon that I mention is in regards to math and the humanities.

The form of argument that I gave is typical of those economists who analyze the human behavior in terms of status, quality, asymmetric information and signaling. Whether or not one finds such an analysis compelling in a given situation requires a subtle judgment call.

Wow, that would be a terrible misreading of what I meant! I was making more of an epistemological point about the contrasts between math and other subjects, than I was about quality of intellect and all that.

I think I read you correctly the first time. I was just commenting that some of the points that you made could be used as evidence in favor of Thomas’ conclusion (I fully understand this was your reason for making them). I apologize if my response was inadvertently distortionary.

Posted by: Jonah Sinick on October 17, 2010 7:14 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Oops,

(I fully understand this was your reason for making them)

should have been

(I fully understand this was not your reason for making them)

:-)

Posted by: Jonah Sinick on October 17, 2010 7:39 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

I’m agnostic on how common the phenomenon that I mention is in regards to math and the humanities.

That’s probably wise. And of course I’m not saying it never happens; in fact it does happen on occasion. For example, reading a biography of Michel Foucault, there was tell of an academic who was absolutely blown away by Foucault’s intellect, thinking he is (was) just about the smartest human being of the twentieth century or something like that, and set out to follow and master every argument and nuance and allusion within his oeuvre. (And eventually invited Foucault out to California to see what would happen if this supermind were to take some LSD…) One could easily imagine someone in mathematics or physics thinking the same about someone like, say, Edward Witten, and harboring the ambition of mastering all of his work and eventually seriously working with him. (The LSD part… may be a long shot!)

I think I read you correctly the first time.

Okay, good. I figured maybe you had, but there is lots of room for misunderstanding on the internet!

Posted by: Todd Trimble on October 17, 2010 10:06 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

The reactions surprise me! I just expressed my experiences: My basic interests are in human mind, history, culture etc., then I noticed the disappointing reality in those fields and (as probably many others) shifted some attention to mathematics mainly because it offers more interesting input. My impressions come from tutoring students of this university, giving advise for Diploma thesis, pdh-projects, essay writing for getting awards, research proposals by professors, etc. Once, even one of my jokes turned into an awarded phd research project (the student had phoned me after midnight with his questions and I did not realize that he took my jokes serious. When he found out it was too late and it took some effort to calm him down.) But all that happens in Germany, maybe in other countries it is different.

Conc. the “intelligence”: John is right that surely there is probably not much a difference in IQ’s, but one feels when communicating with really bright mathematicians something special, like a special serenity and naturality, and you receive so much new stimulation. In retrospect it is for me amazing how far this goes. E.g. some remarks by a friend during a discussion of completely other issues had made me working into what I would else probably have ignored as “strange and complicated stuff”.

Posted by: Thomas on October 17, 2010 7:34 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

“My impressions come from tutoring” … I meaned “in humanities” this time, of course.

Posted by: Thomas on October 17, 2010 8:39 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Jonah wrote:

In Thomas’ defense, note that he describes himself as

a kind of outsider who is just curious about some themes in math too and asks around for infos, explanations and preprints/slides

As a math graduate student I cannot say the same for myself.

Well, you may be fooled here by Thomas Riepe’s modesty. If you read his remarks on mathoverflow he comes across as a bit less of an amateur than you might guess from the comment above.

The notorious humility of mathematicians strikes again! We not only have great brains, we’re incredibly modest too!

Personally I don’t think mathematicians are ‘more intelligent’ than people in the humanities: I think they’re better at reasoning with simple precise concepts, and worse at navigating the ambiguity and complexity that pervades human behavior. Mathematicians are more inclined to throw up their hands in disgust at questions for which there is no clear-cut answer.

For example, when I was a child I decided to make a chart comparing units of time, and I threw a temper tantrum when my father refused to say exactly how long a ‘split second’ was.

I also found it tremendously troubling that he wouldn’t tell me which day ‘midnight’ was on: the day preceding, or the day afterwards? Worrying about something like this is a good omen if you’re fated to eventually study open and closed intervals in real analysis, but not so good if you hope to be robust enough to make your way successfully through the world of human beings.

Indeed, it was only after I really faced up to vagueness and ambiguity that I gradually learned to act like a normal person. By now I think I’m pretty good at it.

Posted by: John Baez on October 17, 2010 5:24 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Personally I don’t think mathematicians are ‘more intelligent’ than people in the humanities: I think they’re better at reasoning with simple precise concepts, and worse at navigating the ambiguity and complexity that pervades human behavior. Mathematicians are more inclined to throw up their hands in disgust at questions for which there is no clear-cut answer.

There’s definitely something to what you’re saying here. The strength of my own early interest in math was in large part grounded in a feeling of safety that came from the certainty and precision of the subject.

On the other hand, parts of mathematical research do require the ability to navigate ambiguous and complex situations. I’ll be producing another relevant annotated collection of quotations soon. Of course, the ambiguity and complexity present within mathematical research of the type that I have in mind may be quite different from that present in the human world so my remark here is not inconsistent with your own.

For example, when I was a child I decided to make a chart comparing units of time, and I threw a temper tantrum when my father refused to say exactly how long a ‘split second’ was.

I also found it tremendously troubling that he wouldn’t tell me which day ‘midnight’ was on: the day preceding, or the day afterwards? This is a good thing to worry about if you’re fated to eventually study real analysis, but not so good if you wish to be robust enough to make your way successfully through the world of human beings.

Fascinating personal anecdote. This reminds me of some of the campers who I worked with at MathPath.

Indeed, it was only after I really faced up to vagueness and ambiguity that I gradually learned to act like a normal person.

My own personal history is similar :-)

Posted by: Jonah Sinick on October 17, 2010 5:56 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Minhyong commented earlier “Even a Fields medallist (and the medal itself) is virtually unknown outside of the mathematicial community.”

This is true in the anti-intellectual world of the UK but is certainly not the case in France. OK, this last time there were several with French nationality or residence among the medallists. Le Monde in my experience, gives details of the Fields medals and always has an attempt to explain what they worked on. It has also reported the main other medals (Abel etc.) As Le Monde is perhaps ‘highbrow’ that might not be thought unusual, but then the more serious of the other national and regional papers repeat the story in shortened form. There are even attempts (sometimes) to report it on the television. I have seen similar reporting in Spain (I think) and serious articles about mathematics (including a long one on Grothendieck) in the German press.

Posted by: Tim Porter on October 31, 2010 7:02 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Dear Tim,

I think I have a vague idea of what you mean, but I don’t myself see any evidence for significant differences across national borders. I could easily find for you interesting articles in the Guardian, programmes on BBC, etc. One common easy target for attacks on ‘anti-intellectualism’ is culture in the US, I suppose. But even there, there is enough of a variation that it’s easy to produce all sorts of anecdotal evidence in all directions. Most discussion of this is at the level of party conversation. Perhaps you’re right, but I have yet to see a serious argument. Anyways, my claim was that the public anonymity of a Fields medallist is a *good* thing, in some sense.

Posted by: Minhyong Kim on November 3, 2010 8:30 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

definitional anti-intellectualism; Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

on ‘anti-intellectualism’ [as] culture in the US – I often tell people that I find default current American culture as “anti-intellectual.” This usually provokes a definitional discussion. My shortest one is: “An intellectual lives FOR ideas, while the great majority of humans only live FROM ideas.”

At a finer granularity, there is a paradox. The best American thinkers, and organizations such as universities, are co-equal with the best in the world. Yet the average level of discourse in the USA, and the average public school, is at best non-intellectual, and at worst anti-intellectual. The USA’s public school system was rated a couple of weeks ago #48 among nations, in Math and Science. At least “Evolution is a myth” candidate Christine O’Donnell lost her election for Senator from Delaware. However…

Posted by: Jonathan Vos Post on November 3, 2010 5:27 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: definitional anti-intellectualism; Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

> The USA’s public school system was rated a couple of weeks ago #48 among nations, in Math and Science.

I am in general suspicious of the criteria these common lists are made, including the common university lists, made up not on the bases of testing the improvement in student knowledge per invested year of study, but on ranks of popular prizes their faculty gets on research, or commercial success of students in the market economy afterwards (the employment depends so much more on family background, racial and other biases of employers, national origin and corruption in employment, more than on real knowledge of applicants measure solely on knowledge and not on commercial university stamp). Still, I am curious who made the list (do you have a link?) which you quote ?

Posted by: Zoran Skoda on November 5, 2010 12:30 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

I also read in the link Baez gave, that as a school kid Grothendieck showed the congruence of triangles by sliding one on top of the other. Is there an alternative way?

Posted by: guru on October 17, 2010 3:29 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

SAS etc.; Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

Speaking for a moment in my capacity as former high school Geometry teacher:

The Side Angle Side postulate (often abbreviated as SAS) states that if two sides and the included angle of one triangle are congruent to two sides and the included angle of another triangle, then these two triangles are congruent.

Side Side Side (SSS) When three pairs of corresponding sides are identical in measure, then these two triangles are congruent.

Posted by: Jonathan Vos Post on October 18, 2010 2:05 AM | Permalink | Reply to this

Blaise Pascal; Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

“The last proceeding of reason is to recognize that there is an infinity of things which are beyond it. There is nothing so conformable to reason as this disavowal of reason.”
– Blaise Pascal

Posted by: Jonathan Vos Post on October 31, 2010 5:20 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

Re: Vanity and Ambition in Mathematics

That is a great thing you have shared!

Posted by: Jason on September 20, 2013 1:48 PM | Permalink | Reply to this

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