More on the AMS and NSA
Posted by Tom Leinster
Just a quickie. This month’s Notices of the AMS ran an article by Michael Wertheimer, recently-retired Director of Research at the NSA, largely about the accusation that the NSA deliberately created a backdoor in a standard cryptographic utility so that they could decode the messages of anyone using it.
Wertheimer’s protestations garnered an unusual amount of press and a great deal of scepticism (e.g. Le Monde, Ars Technica, The Register, Peter Woit, me), with the scepticism especially coming from crypto experts (e.g. Matthew Green, Ethan Heilman).
Some of those experts — also including Bruce Schneier — are writing to the Notices pointing out how misleading Wertheimer’s piece was, with ample historical evidence. And crucially: that in everything Wertheimer wrote, he never actually denied that the NSA created a backdoor.
If you support this letter — and if more broadly, you think it’s important that the AMS reconsiders its relationship with the NSA — then you can add your signature.
Update: The letter from Green, Heilman and Schneier has just appeared in the June/July 2015 issue of the Notices of the AMS, under the title “Misleading mathematicians”.
Posted at February 4, 2015 2:37 AM UTC
Re: More on the AMS and NSA
Having signed this letter, I can’t help but want to add to it. Of course I can’t, since that would invalidate all the current signatures–and I think it is quite effective at making important points the way it is.
My usual mode of operation is avoid shaming and accusing until I am convinced that I can discern the motives and the ethical (or unethical) decision making process of the people I’m criticizing. I may often err badly in this reticence. Of course the NSA is a large agency and thus probably contains people acting altruistically as well as selfishly. Problem is, it might be hard to tell which is which with all the secrecy.
And that’s what I would add. It seems that there comes a point at which the secrecy can have diminishing returns. It begins with “at all costs, keep the enemy in the dark about our true capability.” This can be an important tactic in defeating mortal enemies: witness the willful deceptions that took place after Enigma was broken. However the intelligence agencies have got to figure out how to transition from that mindset to a more civilian one, or else the freedom won in wartime will have a short shelf life.
We like to hear about the Allies winning with clever obfuscations of the truth about their surveillance capabilities. Sure beats inhumane treatment of captives! If it comes out tomorrow that Boko Haram, ISIS or Al Queda are hindered from bloodshed and torture with the help of back-doored encryption I’ll applaud. Maybe the key is to a) periodically go transparent and shine the light on intelligence tactics, followed by b) recruiting the best minds to develop new ones. I don’t know how that period can be optimized (assuming the parallel goals of protecting life and civil liberties), but it sure seems less than optimal just now.